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1 Introduction
Theories of individual choice under uncertainty assume that the decision maker
knows the possible consequences of each alternative action, but he cannot assign
a probability to their occurrence under each particular choice.
One possible approach to such problems of choice takes into account a set of
possible states of the world, so that a feasible action by the agent is represented
by a vector of dierent outcomes contingent on the possible states (see Arrow
and Hurwicz [2], Maskin [28], or Cohen and Jaray [14]). Another approach
represents actions as sets of possible outcomes without specifying any states of
nature. These sets are also called uncertain prospects, or prospects. That is, for
any action (or prospect) it only matters which outcomes may result. Examples
of this approach are Barbera, Barret and Pattanaik [5], Barbera and Pattanaik
[6], Nitzan and Pattanaik [29], Pattanaik and Peleg [32] Bossert [9], [10], and
Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu [11].
Dierent arguments in favour of the set-based approach can be found in
Pattanaik and Peleg [32], or Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu [11]: Compared with the
vector-based approach, the set-based one involves a loss of information as long as
it does not allow the decision maker to take into account the number of states
in which an action leads to a certain outcome. However, the set-based approach
overcomes certain problems of specication of the set of the states of the world
which sometimes arise. For example, the set of states may be so large that it can
hardly be assumed that the decision maker is able to perceive the actions as if
they were vectors of contingent outcomes. Furthermore, it is sometimes argued
that the way of partitioning the set of all possible contingencies in a concrete
number of states is arbitrary to a large extent. Also, the set-based approach is
appropriate for formalizing the Rawlsian formulation of individual values under
the veil of ignorance (Rawls [33]), where presumably no states of the world are
considered.
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Within the set-based approach, models usually consist of extending axiomat-
ically an ordering R, dened over a universal space X of outcomes, to another
preference < over the possible subsets of X. Those subsets are interpreted as
feasible actions, represented by their associated uncertain consequences (or out-
comes). Axioms are imposed on <, and try to capture reasonable properties of it
taking into account the information given by R. Usually the axioms display plau-
sible attitudes towards uncertainty by the agents, as well as certain conditions of
consistency. Well-known rules -such as the maximin rule, the maximax rule, or
their lexicographic extensions,- have actually been characterized by means of this
methodology.1 In the same methodological line, Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu [?]
propose the min-max and max-min criteria, which look rst at the worst (best)
element of each prospect, and secondly at the best (worst) one, and only when
both elements are equal, the prospects are considered indierent. In the same
work these authors also characterize lexicographic extensions of the min-max
and the max-min rules.
It is interesting to point out that almost all of the criteria considered by
the related literature are element-induced. That is, given an ordering R over the
universe of outcomes, the comparison of feasible actions (sets of outcomes) is
always induced from the comparison by means of R of certain elements (out-
comes) within the respective sets, such as the worst element, the best one, or
the second worst if the worst coincide, and so on.
However, element-induction is not the only possible way to compare and
evaluate prospects. For example, if R is an ordering, then a utility function
can be dened over X, and additive processings could be applied. Also, it is
1 Fishburn [15], Heiner and Packard [20], Holzman [21] [22], Kannai and Peleg [24],
Bandyopadhyay [4], or Bossert [8], analyze this formal problem of extension of an
ordering R to a relation < over sets, but without devoting expressely to a problem of
choice under uncertainty. However, these works can be perfectly interpreted in such
a context.
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possible to adapt to our framework the satiscing rule of Simon [39], consisting
of establishing two indiference classes among the prospects: on the one hand
those in which all the outcomes surpasses certain critical value, and on the other
hand those in which at least one outcome does not surpasse that critical value.
Prospects in the former class would then be preferred to those in the latter
one. Russo and Dosher [34] propose the majority of conrming dimensions rule,
according to which, in order to compare a pair of prospects, the decision maker
compares, two-by-two, the possible respective dimensions (outcomes). Then, the
prospect with a majority of better outcomes would be declared better.2 Finally,
nothing at this stage prevents us from considering even an entirely random rule.
Nonetheless, seeing as how published work focuses on element-induced rules
suggests that these have some natural virtue, at least for a context of choice
under complete uncertainty. The primary goal of this work is to open up some
discussion about the suitability of element-induced processes themselves. Also,
as long as these rules presumably belong to a certain common class, it then
becomes necessary to formally describe and dene such a class.
On the other hand, a basic premise of this work is that, independently of
the axiomatic structure which leads to dierent particular rules, each of these
rules can be intuitively explained as the direct result of dierent reasonable and
basic patterns of behavior. For example, the maximin rule could be interpreted
as the result of a risk-averse behavior by an agent who never looks further than
one alternative; the lexicographic extension of the maximin as the result of a
risk-averse behavior by an agent who is in some way recurrent or iterative; and
analogous explanations can be gured out for the maximax and its lexicographic
extension. Even the max-min and min-max rules of Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu
[11] are interpretable as following certain patterns of behavior based on \focal"
or \conspicuous" characteristics of the prospects.
2 This rule is not well dened for prospects of dierent size but plausible extensions
for dierent-sized prospects could be dened.
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Those patterns have to do with the decision maker’s internal attitudes relat-
ing to the problem of choice, such as his risk aversion, his willingness to iterate
when ties appear, or the tendency to focus on particular characteristics of the
sets. Now the question is: Is it possible to nd such plausible explanations for
any kind of element-induced processes of choice? Let us consider the case of an
individual (call him \Gage") who, in order to evaluate feasible actions, takes
into account the worst possible outcome when the number in the prospect is
even, and the best one when the number of outcomes is odd, and then extends
the preference relation obtained over these elements to rank the corresponding
actions.
Undoubtedly, his behavior seeks some procedural logic, but which is arbitrary
to a large extent, as long as his pattern does not display reasonable attitudes
when facing the problem of choice under uncertainty. Actually, models of decision
usually try to avoid these kinds of pathological behavior. The standard approach
consists of impossing axioms on <, for example: \given a prospect A, if a new
possible outcome is added to A and that outcome is worse than all the outcomes
in A, then the enlarged prospect should be worse". Thus, Gage’s behavior would
be implicitely rejected by imposing such an axiom.
But conditions could be impossed on the mere process of evaluation too.
In this example, the inconsistencies lay in the process itself, more than in the
resultant inconsistencies when comparing actions as a product of that process.
Actually, in Herbert Simon’s terms, Gage’s irrationality is procedural rather than
substantive.3 From an epistemological point of view, the procedural approach
3 According to Simon [41], \behavior is procedurally rational when it is the outcome
of appropriate deliberation", while \behavior is substantively rational when it is
appropriate to the achievement of given goals within the limits imposed by given
conditions and constraints". Also, behavior is procedurally irrational when it simply
\represents impulsive response to aective mechanisms without an adequate inter-
vention of thought".
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seems to be more apropriate than the substantive one. The following sections try
to justify the view that, in a context of complete uncertainty, element-induction
processes are, a priori, procedurally plausible as a natural way of gathering infor-
mation and the evaluation of the alternatives. But even under this assumption,
we would like to somehow restrict the kind of element-inductive processes to
those which obey certain procedural coherence.
In Gage’s example, let us consider an action fx; y; zg such that x is bet-
ter than y, and y is better than z. Gage takes x as a representative, focal, or
paradigmatic element of the prospect; and if it shrank to fx; yg, then Gage would
concentrate on y as a representative element. However, if x is representative for
fx; y; zg, it would be reasonable to impose that x should be also representative
for fx; yg. That is, a property close to the condition  of rational choice (Sen [35])
could be applied to the way the agent evaluates each prospect. The justications
for imposing such a condition would not be far from the justications argued
for imposing it in the standard framework of rational choice. In fact, deciding
which attribute to evaluate rst within a certain prospect, is not a much dier-
ent mental exercise than is the standard one of choosing an alternative among a
universe of alternatives. But, in our context, the former problem is simpler than,
and previous to, that of choosing among prospects (each of which consisting of
multiple possible outcomes). Thus, the demand for rationality of the procedure
is, in some way, weaker then the standard one, based on the nal results of that
procedure.
In summary, this paper is a contribution to the set-based approach to the
problem of choice under uncertainty, but a dierent formalization of the prob-
lem is presented. Conditions are imposed at three distinct levels: rst, the model
takes as an assumption that rankings over actions are element-induced, and the
suitability of such an assumption is discussed. Second, a condition of rational-
ity, which is an adaptation of Sen’s  condition , is imposed on the evaluation
process of each set, and some results are proposed. That is, a model of rational
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evaluation of the sets, in contrast with models of rational choice among sets, is
proposed. Assumptions at these rst two levels represent procedural conditions on
the decision problem. Third, some additional axioms are imposed on the binary
relation over set. These axioms display, at a very basical level, dierent possible
attitudes of the agent towards uncertainty, and allow us to characterize some
known rules in an alternative fashion as particular cases of element-induced and
rational rules. That is, unlike the rest of the set-based literature, these axioms do
not play the role of introducing the \rationality" in the agent’s behavior. They
simply explain dierent ways of behaving rationally according to the condition
imposed on the procedure of evaluation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the notation and prelimi-
nar denitions are posed. Section 3 examines and formally denes the class of
element-induced rules. In Section 4 the basic condition of rationality for element-
induced processes is proposed. Section 5 contains some axioms which capture
dierent possible attitudes towards uncertainty, and some results of characteri-
zation are presented. Section 6 presents some additional properties which allow
us to characterize the max-min rule, the min-max rule and their lexicographic
extensions as element-induced rational rules. In Section 7 some nal remarks are
noted.
2 Notation and Denitions
Let X be a nite set of outcomes (#X = n). Let Z denote 2Xn;, and let R be
a linear preference ordering dened over X (that is, R is a reflexive, transitive,
complete and antisymmetric binary relation). The interpretation of R is the
common one: 8x; y 2 X; xRy is read as \x is at least as desirable as y". P
denotes the asymmetric factor of R, reading xPy as \x is more desirable than
y". For all A 2 Z, a and a denote, respectively, the worst and bests element of
A according to R, and a and a denote, respectively the second worst and second
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best element of A according to R. Since R is a linear ordering, hence, of all these
elements are well-dened and unique for all A 2 Z.
The formal concern of this work is the extension of the linear ordering R over
X to an ordering < over Z (an ordering is a reflexive, complete and transitive
binary relation).  and  denote, respectively, the asymmetric and symmetric
parts of <. This formal problem of extension is interpreted in a context of choice
under complete uncertainty, where each element A of Z is interpreted as a set of
possible outcomes of a certain action (or prospect), such that the decision maker
does not assign any probability nor any likelihood ranking to any of the possible
outcomes. Therefore, < is interpreted as reflecting the agent’s preference over
the possible actions.
Given a nite set X and certain relation R dened on it, the following rules,
standard in the eld, are going to be analyzed:
{ The maximin relation <m is dened by: 8A;B 2 Z;A <m B i aRb
{ The maximax relation <M is dened by: 8A;B 2 Z;A <M B i aRb
{ The leximin relation<lm is dened by: 8A 2 Z;#A = r, let A = fa1; a2; : : : ; arg
s.t. arRar−1R : : :Ra2Ra1. Then, 8A;B 2 Z, A <lm B i 9l 2 N; l 
maxf#A;#Bg s.t. ai = bi8i < l, and [(alRbl) or (al exists and bl does
not exist)]
{ The leximax relation<LM is dened by: 8A 2 Z;#A = r, letA = fa1; a2; : : : ; arg
s.t. a1Ra2R : : :Rar. Then, 8A;B 2 Z;A <LM B i 9l 2 N; l  maxf#A;#Bg
s.t. ai = bi8i < l, and [(alRbl) or (al exists and bl does not exist)]
Also, the following rules, which appear in Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu [11] will
be considered:
{ The min-max relation <mM is dened by: 8A;B 2 Z;A <mM B i (aP b)
or (a = b and aRb)
{ The max-min relation <Mm is dened by: 8A;B 2 Z;A <mM B i (aP b)
or (a = b and aRb)
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{ The lexicographic min-max relation <lmM , and lexicographic max-min rela-
tion <LMm are dened by (see Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu [11]):
8A 2 Z, let A0 = A and
nA =
8<:#A=2 if #A is even(#A− 1)=2 if #A is odd
If nA > 0, let, for all t = 1; : : : ; nA,At = At−1nfat−1; at−1g. For allA;B 2 Z,
let nAB = min(fnA; nBg).
then,
8A;B 2 Z;A <lmM B i 9t 2 f0; : : : ; nABg such that (As mM Bs8s  t)
and (At <mM Bt or Bt = ;)
8A;B 2 Z;A <LMm B i 9t 2 f0; : : : ; nABg such that (As Mm Bs8s  t)
and (At <Mm Bt or Bt = ;)
3 Bounded rationality and element-induced rules
As has been pointed out in Section 1, in many decisional contexts the decision
maker compares sets by comparing certain elements within the sets. The most
natural way to understand this behavior is by assuming that the decision maker
concentrates in one element of the set which for him is representative or focal,
and which, for some reason, constitutes a good proxy of the value of the set,
perhaps because it represents a key feature of the set in the decisional context
where the comparison of sets is being made. This behavior can be formalized
by assuming that there exists a certain function f : Z −! X which determines
for each prospect, the outcome in the set which is focal or representative for
the agent, and such that 8A;B 2 Z, A < B $ f(A)Rf(B). For example, in
a context of choice over opportunity sets, the standard indirect-utility criterion
is a clear case of an element-induced rule, where, 8A 2 Z, f(A) = a. In the
context of complete uncertainty -in which decision maker does not control the
nal result of the set-, the maximin and maximax rules are also examples of this.
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However, the only information obtained from the rst-focal elements may be
insucient to declare a strict preference between a pair of sets. One possible
cause is that the preference relation over the basic elements is incomplete, or,
in the case of our formal framework, that the respective focal elements may
coincide. In this situation the decision maker can directly declare both sets as
indierent, or otherwise look for another feature in the set which helps him to
establish a preference. If the agent looks for more information, he will plausibly
repeat the inductive procedure concentrating on other element of each set (if
it exists). In other words, there exists another function f 0 : Z −! X which,
8A 2 Z, determines the second-focal element in A, and such that: 8A;B 2 Z,
f(A)Pf(B) implies A  B, but if f(A) = f(B), then A < B $ [(f 0(A)Rf 0(B))
or (f 0(A) exists and f 0(B) does not exist)].4 If, at this second step a new tie arises,
then the again agent faces the same dilemma: to continue with another step
in this sequential process, or to declare the sets indierent. Again, if the agent
decides to continue, a new similar tie, and therefore a new similar dilemma might
arise, and so on. Thus, we could formalize the process of evaluation of prospects
and comparison between pairs of prospects by considering succesive functions
f : Z −! X, whose number would depend on the number of iterations the
agent is willing to make before declaring an indierence. Although interpretable
in an \iterative" or \sequential" way, this kind of decision procedure is also
element-induced: It is the value of one of the elements in the set which nally
determines the preference relation between sets.
If the evaluation procedure over sets is of this type, then dierent degrees of
\iterativeness" can be established, depending on the maximal number of times
the agent is willing to iterate before declaring an indierence. In this sense,
lexicographic rankings of prospects are n-times-iterative; the maximax or the
maximin are once-iterative, or the max-min and the min-max rules are twice
4 In the subsequent formalization of the decision procedure it is assumed that, for all
prospects, the rst focal element always exists.
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iterative. We could imagine other examples of criteria which evaluate lexico-
graphically the two best (or two worst) elements of the sets, or many other
combinations.
The literature on bounded rationality, as well as experimental psychology,
provide intuitive justication for this element-inductive and sequential behav-
ior, and also provide an explanation for the eventual existence of a limit in the
sequential process, which implies that the decision maker might ignore poten-
tially relevant information concerning alternatives. In particular, that evaluation
strategy is an example of what in psychology is called attribute-based process-
ing of alternatives, where the values of the alternatives on a single attribute
are processed before information about a second attribute is processed, the sec-
ond atribute is analyzed before the third one, and so on. Russo and Dosher
[34] suggest that attribute-based processing is cognitively easier than a holistic
processing where all the dimensions of the alternatives (possible outcomes of
the dierent prospects in our case) are taken into account. In the same line of
thought, Payne, Bettman and Johnson [31] provide experimental evidence that
under time pressure and in complex decisional environments, agents tend to
choose lexicographic prodecures, and that these procedures perform better. It is
also sometimes argued that, like computers, man’s ways of thinking are serial in
organization; one step in thought follows another, and solving problems requires
the execution of a certain amount of steps in sequence (Simon [41]).
The basic assumption behind this simplifying behavior is that there is a back-
ground computational eort for evaluating the alternatives. As a consequence of
this computational eort (or limited computational abilities) of the agent, the
decision maker tends to substitute the complex reality by a handly simplica-
tion of it, consisting of its main features. Then, the computational limits of the
agent leads then to a behavior based on a satisfactory performance rather than
on a maximizer pattern. These kinds of arguments have been well-developed in
works on bounded rationality (see for example pioneer works of Simon [39][40],
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or March and Simon [27]).
Thus, when choosing which elements to consider, the decision maker presum-
ably concentrates on those which: a) contain an important characteristic of the
set, and b) display features easily identiable, such as the maximal element or
the minimal element.5 The agent may be satised with the information given by
the evaluation of one or two representative outcomes if this information allows
him to establish a strict preference at a low cost. On the other hand the agent
may declare, at a certain point, a relation of indierence, ignoring potentially
relevant information if the marginal computational cost is expected to be high.
One could argue that assuming the existence of a linear ordering R on X is
in contradiction with the assumption of bounded rationality based on limited
computational abilities of the agent. However, the existence of R means that the
agent is able to order all the alternatives in X, which is compatible with the
idea that certain eort could be necessary for: a) identifying and ordering all of
the possible outcomes of a given prospect; and b) nding out how to compare a
given pair of prospects, especially if they consist of a large number of possible
outcomes.
Obviously this kind of heuristics implies a potential cost in terms of less
accurate choices. Thus a trade-o between accurate choices and computational
savings arises. The mere adoption of an iterative process is a consequence of
the need to simplify the decision problem. But even among iterative processes,
computational eort acts as a deterrent against the indenite repetition of the
sequential process, while the desire for accurate choices compells the decision
maker to iterate more. As Beach and Mitchell [7], Payne [30], or Russo and
Dosher [34] argue, \the selection strategy is the result of the costs derived from
the eort required to use a rule", (in our case to iterate indenitely), \and
benets from selecting the best alternative". That is, the number of iterations
5 Clearly, median element(s) are representative, but in the presence of computational
eort it is hardly defendable that they are easily identiable.
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applied by the agent may narrowly depend on the particular environment where
the decision problem is considered. It will depend upon internal characteristics
of the decision maker, such as his persistance, and upon such external factors as
complexity of the alternatives, time pressure, the similarity of the alternatives,
or their overall attractiveness (see Payne [30]).
In sum, although non-element induced criteria are plausible too, element-
induced rules seem to provide a good equilibrium between the high computa-
tional eort required by holistic rules, such as arithmetic operations, and the
lack of accuracy of the other rules, such as random rules. Also, within the class
of element-induced rules, the dierent possible degrees of iterativeness allow us
to display diverse combinations of the trade-os between both kinds of factors.
We are ready now to provide the following formal denition:
Denition1. Let < be an ordering dened on Z, and let R be a linear ordering
dened on X. < is said to be an element-induced rule if there exists a natural
number k, k  n, and 8A 2 Z there exists a mapping F : Z −! Z, F (A) =
ff1(A); : : : ; fjA(A)g 8A 2 Z such that:
1. fi(A) 2 A 8A 2 Z, 8i  jA
2. jA = k if #A  k and jA 2 [#A; k] if #A  k
3. 8A;B 2 Z, A < B , 9l  k such that 8i 2 N , i < l, fi(A) = fi(B) and
[(fl(A)Rfl(B) or (fl(A) exists and fl(B) does not exist)]
For all A 2 Z, F (A) = ff1(A); : : : ; fjA(A)g will be said to be \the evaluation
sequence of set A," and F a \mapping of evaluation sequences". For any set, the
evaluation sequence identies both the elements and the order in which they are
successively evaluated by the agent. In the denition, k represents the agent’s
willingness to iterate in order to nd successive focal elements: The agent is
never willing to iterate more than k times in any set whose cardinal is greater
than k, and, on the other hand, for sets whose cardinal is smaller than k, the
agent is willing to iterate at least as many times as elements are in the set,
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but never more than k times. Therefore the pair (k; F ) describes an evaluation
procedure: the number of elements that might be considered in each set, the
elements considered, an in which order they are going to be considered. The
denition of element-induced rules simply states that it is possible to nd an
evaluation procedure (k; F ) which \explains" or \rationalizes" a given ordering
in terms of the representation statment 3 in the denition. When, given an
ordering <, it is possible to nd a certain pair (k; F ) satifying the conditions
in the previous denition, it will be said that \< is element-induced in relation
to (k; F )," or simply that \< is element-induced in relation with F " when the
particular value of k is not meaningful for the discourse.
The idea of evaluation sequence is related to, but dierent from, the standard
concept of choice function in Arrow [1] or Sen [35]). For any A 2 Z, F (A) is a
sequence of functions, while a choice function is unique. Also, choice functions
determine, among a set of available alternatives, the subset of those which are
choosen by the agent. In contrast, F determines, in a recurrent way, and for each
set of possible uncertain outcomes, the outcome that attracts the attention of
the agent, but which does not necessarily happen as long as the nal result is
out of the control of the decision maker.
4 Rational Evaluation of Actions
Denition 1 provides the formal tools to allow us to establish an alternative
theory of choice over prospects based on the procedural aspects, that is, based
on particular properties of the evaluation procedure.
For example, despite the many conceptual and formal dierences between
choice functions over alternatives on the one hand, and evaluation sequences
over sets of outcomes on the other, it makes sense to extrapolate the standard
properties of rationality from the former to the latter. In particular, F will be
assumed to satisfy the following condition:
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Rationality: 8A;B 2 Z, s.t. B  A, 8i 2 N, i  n,
if ff1(A); : : : ; fi−1(A)g = ff1(B); : : : ; fi−1(B)g; fi(A) = a; and a 2 B, then
fi(B) = a:
That is, given a set A and a subset B of A, if a set of successive \represen-
tative" elements of A coincide with those in B, and if the next representative
element in A belongs to B, then that element should be the next representative
one in B as well.
Note that if F is rational, and for certain i 2 N, ff1(A); : : : ; fi−1(A)g =
ff1(B); : : : ; fi−1(B)g, then necessarily, for all j < i, fj(A) = fj(B).
When i = 1, the Rationality assumption is even closer to the classical postu-
late of rationality in Cherno [13]) and -property of choice functions in Sen [35],
but, as mentioned, it is now extended to the context of the sequential evaluation
of prospects.
The assumption of Rationality for F is not in conflict with the general motiva-
tion of bounded rationality underlying this work. The decision maker is allowed
to have a limited ability to compute all of the possible outcomes of the prospects
compelling him to concentrate only on a limited number of outcomes. It is plau-
sible to assume that if the agent has been able to identify certain outcomes as
representative in a given prospect A, he should then be able to identify them if
they are present in a subset of A. Hence, Rationality of F simply imposes that,
once the agent has decided what to concentrate on, he maintains what March
[26] calls a selective or calculated rationality. Similar arguments can be found
in the Prospect Theory of Kahneman and Tversky [23][42]): once the decision
maker completes the phase of simplication of the decision problem, certain ra-
tionality in his simplied analysis is maintained.6 For example, let us suppose
6 Actually, some authors in the eld of Organization Theory argue that it is precisely
the human necessity of being coherent and following clear goals which motivates
satisfactory-performance-based behavior, that is, behavior based on the satisfaction
of those clear and simplied goals (see Friedman [16], or Krulee [25]).
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that, instead of evaluating all of the possible outcomes of a certain action A, the
agent concentrates on what he identies as the worst possible element, x. If the
agent is rational in the chosen proxy method for the value of prospects, for any
subset of A containing x, he should not concentrate on other elements dierent
from x.
At this point the following denitions can be posed:
Denition2. Let < an ordering. We will say that \< is an element-induced
rational rule" if there exist a natural number k and a rational mapping of evalu-
ation sequences F such that < is an element-induced rule in relation with (k; F ).
Denition3. Given an ordering <, the minimal number k such that there exists
F such that F is rational and < is element-induced in relation to (k; F ) will be
said to be \the degree of iterativeness of <."
When, for a given element-induced rule <, the degree of iterativeness is k,
then it will be said that \< is k-times iterative". As long as labeling an ordering
< as k-times iterative only makes sense if < is an element-induced rational rule,
whenever that expression is used it will be understood that < is also an element-
induced and rational rule.
The previous denitions allow us to present the following results: Lemma 4
establishes that the rules dened in Section 2 are particular cases of element-
induced rational rules. Lemma 5 states that any rational rule which is a linear
ordering must be n-times iterative:
Lemma 4. <m;<M ;<lm;<LM ;<mM ;<Mm;<lmM and <LMm are element-induced
rational rules.
Proof. :
{ <m: Let k = 1. For all A 2 Z, let F (A) = ff1(A)g = a. Then, for all
A;B 2 Z, A <m B , f1(A)Rf1(B), which proves that < is once-iterative.
Also, F is rational: 8A;B s.t. B  A implies f1(A) = a = b = f1(B).
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{ <M : The proof is analogous to the one of <m.
{ <lm : Let k = #X(= n). For all A 2 Z, #A = j, let F (A) = fa1; : : : ; ajg
such that ajRaj−1R : : : a1. Then, 8A;B 2 Z, A < B , 9l  max(#A;#B)
( n) such that 8i 2 N, i < l, fi(A) = fi(B) and [fl(A)Rfl(B) or (fl(A)
exists and fl(B) does not exist)], which demostrates that < is an element-
induced rule in relation to (k = n; F ). To see that F is also rational note
that, as for all A, F (A) is A inversely ordered according to R, then, for all
B  A, ff1(A); : : : ; fi−1(A)g = ff1(B); : : : ; fi−1(B)g; fi(A) = a; and a 2 B,
imply fi(B) = a.
{ <LM : The proof is analogous to the one of <lm .
{ <mM : Let k = 2. For all A 2 Z, let F (A) = ff1(A); f2(A)g=fa; ag. Then,
8A;B 2 Z, A <mM B , f1(A)Rf1(B) or (f1(A) = f1(B) and f2(A)Pf2(B))
To demostrate that F is also rational note that, 8A;B 2 Z, B  A, f1(A)(=
a) 2 B implies f1(B) = f1(A), and also, if f1(A) = f1(B) and f2(A)(= a) 2
B, that implies f2(B) = f2(A).
{ <Mm: The proof is analogous to the one of <mM .




2 − 1 if #A is even
#A+1
2 − 1 if #A is odd
Let, for all t = 1; : : : ; mA, At = At−1nfat−1; at−1g.
Let, 8A 2 Z, F (A) = fa0; a0; a1; a1; : : : ; at; atg
Then, 8A;B 2 Z, A <lmM B , 9l  n such that 8i < l, fi(A) = fi(B) and
[(fl(A)Rfl(B)) or ((fl(A) exists and fl(B) does not exist)], which proves
that < is an element-induced rule in relation to (k = n; F ). Now, rationality
of F should be proved:
Clearly, for all A;B 2 Z, if B  A and f1(A)(= a) 2 B, then f1(B)(= b) =
f1(A). Also, if f1(A) = f1(B) and f2(A)(= a) 2 B, then f2(B)(= b) = f2(A).
If f1(A) = f1(B); f2(A) = f2(B), and f3(A)(= min(Anfa; ag) belongs to B,
then f3(B)(= min(Bnfb; bg) must be equal to f3(A). Due to the manner by
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which F is constructed, the argument can be repeated to assert that 8i 2 N,
i  n, 8A;B 2 Z;B  A,
ff1(A); : : : ; fi−1(A)g = ff1(B); : : : ; fi−1(B)g; fi(A) = a; and a 2 B, implies
fi(B) = a:
{ <LMm: The proof is similar to the one of <lmM .
ut
Lemma 5. Let < be a rational rule dened on Z. If < is a linear ordering, then
it is n-times iterative.
Proof. Let < be a rational rule dened on Z such that < is also a linear ordering.
Let us suppose that < is not n-times iterative. As < is rational, that implies
that there exists a rational mapping F and a natural number k, k < n, such that
< is element-induced in relation to (k; F ). Take F (X) = ff1(X); : : : ; fm(X)g.
By the denition of element-induced rule and by hypothesis m = k. Consider
X = fx 2 X s:t: 9i  k s:t: x = fi(X)g. As k < n, X  X. Therefore,
by Rationality, fi(X) = fi(X) 8i  k. As < is element-induced in relation to
(k; F ), this implies X  X. Therefore < is not a linear ordering, reaching a
contradiction
ut
Finally, an additional property of F will be considered in some cases, but un-
like the Rationality condition, it will not be maintained as a general assumption
throughout the paper:
Iteration Independence: 8A 2 Z; 8i 2 N, i  n;
fi(A) = f1(Anff1(A); : : : ; fi−1(A)g)
Iteration Independence establishes that, given a set A, then the element
considered by the agent in a certain iteration i for A is the same as the one he
would have considered in a rst iteration for a set consisting of A after removing
those elements considered in previous iterations. For example, consider a set A
consisting on the alternatives fa; b; c; d; eg, and f1(A) = a, f2(A) = b. Then
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Iteration Independence requires that f3(A) should be the same as f1(fc; d; eg).
This property establishes a kind of coherency in the evaluation process. We can
also take the equality in the inverse sense in order to appreciate the meaning of
this axiom from other perspective. Returning to the previous example, the rst
focal element of fc; d; eg should be the same as the i-focal element of any set
where, after removing the previous focal elements, the remaining elements are
c; d, and e.
A direct implication of Iteration Independence is that, in the sequential pro-
cess of evaluation, the agent always concentrates sucessively on new elements
of the set. That is, 8A 2 Z, 8i 6= j, fi(A) 6= fj(A). Another consequence of
Iteration Independence is that, 8A 2 Z, F (A) is a permutation of A.
5 Attitudes Towards Uncertainty: Some Axioms and
Characterization Results
The class of element-induced rational rules contains a wide range of possible
criteria. The agent’s dierent possible attitudes towards risk play an important
role at this stage. Some of these attitudes will be expressed by means of the
following simple axioms:
Simple Risk Aversion (SRAV) 8x; y 2 X, xPy implies fxg  fx; yg
Simple Risk Neutrality (SRN) 8x; y 2 X, xPy implies fxg  fx; yg
Simple Risk Appeal (SRAP) 8x; y 2 X, xPy implies fx; yg  fxg
(SRAV) is very natural in a context of choice under complete uncertainty.
(SRN) and (SRAP) are not so plausible in that context, but as long as they are
satised by some rules in the eld they will be considered.
The following theorems provide characterizations of some of the rules dened
in Section 2, but from a dierent perspective. The results show that these rules
can be characterized as particular cases of element-induced rational rules which
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respond to dierent possible attitudes towards uncertainty, and to dierent par-
ticular properties of the evaluation procedure.
Theorem 6. Let < be an ordering dened on Z. <=<m if and only if < is a
once-iterative rule and satises (SRAV).
Theorem 7. Let < be an ordering dened on Z. <=<M if and only if < is a
once-iterative rule and satises (SRN).
Theorem 8. Let < be an ordering dened on Z. <=<lm if and only if < satises
(SRAV) and there exists a rational and Iteration Independent mapping F in
relation to which < is element-induced.
Theorem 9. Let < be an ordering dened on Z. <=<LM if and only if <
satises (SRAP) and there exists a rational and Iteration Independent mapping
F in relation to which < is element-induced.
Proof of Theorem 6:
If < is once-iterative, that implies that there exists F : Z −! Z such that: F is
rational; 8A 2 Z jA = 1; and 8A;B 2 Z, A < B , f1(A)Rf1(B). First, we will
prove that if < satises (SRAV) and if F is rational, then f1(A) = a 8A: This is
obvious when #A = 1, so we assume #A > 1. Let us suppose that there exists
A 2 Z such that f1(A) = a 6= a. Then, by (SRAV), fag  fa; ag. As k = 1
that implies f1(fag)Pf1(fa; ag), that is, f1(fag) = a and f1(fa; ag) = a. By
Rationality f1(fa; ag) = a implies f1(A) 6= a, which results in a contradiction.
To prove that there exists a rational mapping F such that <m is element-
induced in relation to (k = 1; F ), see the corresponding part of the proof of
Lemma 4. That the degree of iterativeness is 1 is obvious because, by denition
of element-induced rule, k < 1 is impossible. That <m satises (SRAV) is easily
proven.
Proof of Theorem 7: The proof is analogous to that for <m, but instead of
using (SRAV), (SRN) needs to be applied.
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Proof of Theorem 8:
If < is element-induced, then all of the conditions of Denition 1 are satised.
First, we prove that if F is rational, Iteration Independent, and if < satises
(SRAV), then 8A 2 Z, f1(A) = a: Let us suppose that there exists A 2 Z such
that f1(A) = a 6= a. By (SRAV) fag  fa; ag. As F is Iteration Independent,
f2(fag) does not exist and f2(fa; ag) does exist. Therefore, as < is element-
induced in relation to F , fag  fa; ag is only possible if f1(fag)Pf1(fa; ag),
in which case, proceeding as in the proof of Theorem 6, we reach a contradiction.
Now, 8A 2 Z, #A = r, let fa1; a2; : : : ; arg such that arRar−1R : : :Ra1.
Then, if 8A 2 Z, f1(A) = a, by Iteration Independence, 8A 2 Z, 8i  #A,
fi(A) = ai and 8j > #A, fj(A) does not exist. Therefore, as < is n-times
iterative, 8A;B 2 Z, A < B , 9l  n such that 8i 2 N, i < l, ai = bi and
[alRbl or (al exists and bl does not exist)]. That is, A < B , A <lm B.
To prove that there exists an Iteration Independent and rational mapping
F , and certain natural number k such that <lm is element-induced in relation
to (k; F ), consider the corresponding part of the proof in Lemma 4. That <lm
satises (SRAV) is easily proven.
Proof of Theorem 9:
If < is element-induced then all of the conditions of Denition 1 are satised.
First, we prove that, if F is rational, Iteration Independent and if < satises
(SRAP), then 8A 2 Z, f1(A) = a: Let us suppose that there exists A 2 Z such
that f1(A) = a 6= a. By (SRAP) fa; ag  fag. As < is element-induced in
relation to F this implies that:
(i):f1(fa; ag)Pf1(fag), which is impossible, or
(ii):f1(fa; ag) = f1(fag), that is, f1(fa; ag) = a. Then, by Rationality of F ,
f1(A) 6= a, which is a contradiction.
Now, 8A 2 Z, #A = r, let fa1; a2; : : : ; arg such that a1Ra2R : : :Rar. At this
stage, the proof is similar to the proof of <lm .
To prove that there exists an Iteration Independent and rational mapping
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F , and certain natural number k such that <LM is element-induced in relation
to (k; F ), consider the corresponding part of the proof in Lemma 4. That <LM
satises (SRAP) is easily proven. ut
Next we show the pertinent examples to prove the independence of the con-
ditions used in Theorems 6, 7, 8 and 9. For all these examples we will assume
that sets are ordered according to R from the best to the worst element.
1. <m
{ <lm satises (SRAV), but it is not once-iterative, that is, it is impossible
to nd a pair (k; F ) such that F is rational and <lm is once-iterative in
relation to F .
{ <M is once-iterative, but it does not satisfy (SRAV).
2. <M
{ Let < be dened on Z such that 8A;B 2 Z, A  B. Then < satises
(SRN), but it is not once-iterative (actually it is not element-induced)
{ <m is once-iterative, but does not satisfy (SRN).
3. <lm
{ <LM is an element-induced rational rule in relation to certain Iteration
Independent mapping F , but it does not satisfy (SRAV).
{ Let fx; y; zg  fxg  fx; yg  fyg  fx; zg  fy; zg  fzg. Then <
satises (SRAV) and there exists an Iteration Independent F with which
< is element-induced, but < is not rational.
{ <m satises (SRAV) and is rational, but there does not exist any Itera-
tion Independent mapping F with which < is element-induced.
4. <LM
{ <lm is element-induced in relation to certain Iteration Independent map-
ping F , but <lm does not satisfy (SRAP).
{ Let fx; yg  fx; zg  fxg  fy; zg  fyg  fx; y; zg  fzg. Then
< satises (SRAP) and there exists an Iteration Independent F with
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which < is element-induced, but < is not rational. (It can be proved
that, for #X < 3, if an ordering < is element-induced with an Iteration
Independent F , then F must be rational).
{ Let fx; y; zg  fx; yg  fx; zg  fxg  fy; zg  fyg  fzg. Then <
satises (SRAP) and is rational, but there does not exist any Iteration
Independent mapping F with which < is element-induced.
6 The min-max rule, the max-min rule and their
lexicographic extensions
The main object of this section is the analysis, as element-induced rules, of
<mM , <Mm, <lmM and <LMm. These constitute plausible rules in the context
of choice under complete uncertainty if we believe in the existence of computa-
tional costs as far as they represent situations where the decision maker tends
to concentrate on focal aspects of the prospects. The hypothesis that under
uncertainty, the agent focusess on certain outcomes is initially due to Shackle
[37]. According to Shackle’s theory, in the context of choice under complete un-
certainty, the agent evaluates actions taking into account only two outcomes:
the one that the agent most intensively desires and the one that he less inten-
sively desires. The desirability function depends directly upon the value of the
outcome, and inversely upon the potential surprise its ocurrence would cause.
However, Shackle’s elegant explanation of his conjecture, unlike our approach,
has nothing to do with any kind of bounded rationality assumption, but with the
non-probabilistic nature of the context of choice under complete uncertainty.7
(For further detail see Shackle [37, pp.37-42 and 109-114)], [38]).
The analysis of these four rules is done under this separate section because
7 Carter [12] remarks on Shackle’s theory considering some intuitions about the sim-
plifying behavior to argue in favour of the hypothesis that the focalizing tendency
might not concentrate on the extreme values of the set.
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additional conditions on F and < need to be considered, and because of the
length of the proofs.
As for F , two new conditions are considered:
Elimination in Uncertain Prospects
8A 2 Z, #A  2, 8i; j 2 N (i; j  n), fi(A) 6= fj(A)
Alternate Iteration Independence
8A 2 Z, 8i 2 N, 2 < i  #A,
fi(A) =
8<:f1(Anff1(A); : : : ; fi−2(A)g) when i is oddf2(Anff1(A); : : : ; fi−2(A)g) when i is even
Elimination in Uncertain Prospects establishes that, for all those prospects
which are uncertain (that is, those sets which contain at least two possible out-
comes), the agent concentrates sucessively in dierent representative elements.
Alterante Iteration Independence is close to, but dierent from, the simple
Iteration Independence condition dened in the previous Section: The intuition
behind the original Iteration Independence was that any iteration constitutes an
independent step in the sequential process of evaluation, and that it does not
matter in which moment the step is made if the evaluated set is the same. In
contrast, under Alternate Iteration Independence, we can interprete the evalu-
ation process as if each of those steps were made by two successive iterations,
and as if the independence were required at the level of steps, not at the level of
simple iterations.
When F satises Elimination in Uncertain Prospects (Alternate Iteration
Independence) it will be said that F is Eliminative (Alternate Iteration Inde-
pendent)
The following additional axioms, concerning < will be also considered:
Potential Benet Appeal (PBAP) 8A 2 Z, 8x 2 XnA s.t. 8a 2 A xPa,
A [ fxg  A
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Risk Aversion (RAV) 8A 2 Z, 8x 2 XnA s.t. 8a 2 A aPx, A  A [ fxg
Simple Uncertainty Aversion (SUAV) 8x; y; z 2 X s.t. xPyPz, fyg 
fx; y; zg
Simple Uncertainty Appeal (SUAP) 8x; y; z 2 X s.t. xPyPz, fx; y; zg 
fyg
Simple Richness Appeal (SRICH): 8x; y; z 2 X s.t. xPyPz, fx; y; zg 
fx; zg
(PBAP) ensures that by adding to a certain prospect A a new outcome which
is better than all of the possible outcomes in A, then the enlarged prospect
becomes strictly better. (RAV) extends condition (SRAV) to prospects of any
size. (RAV) and (PBAP) together are equivalent to the Ga¨rdenfors Principle
(see Gardenfors [19] or Kannai and Peleg [24]).
(SUAV) ((SUAP)) establishes that adding to a secure prospect fyg a bet-
ter and a worse possible outcome leads to a better (worse) new prospect. Close
axioms are considered and widely discussed by Bossert [10] and Bossert, Pat-
tanaik and Xu [11]. Both are plausible in the context of choice under complete
uncertainty, and simply display dierent attitudes towards uncertainty.
(SRICH) establishes that any set A with at least three elements is strictly
better than another set consisting only of the best and worst elements of A.
(SRICH) can be interpreted also as an attitude towards uncertainty: the decision
maker prefers to diversify the possible outcomes obtainable within the range of
possible results, rather than being constrained to the two extremes.
Lemma 10. Let < be an ordering dened on Z. If < is an n-times iterative rule
in relation to a certain Eliminative mapping F , then < satises (PBAP).
Proof. Let A 2 Z such that 9x 2 XnA s.t. xPai 8ai 2 A. Let the rational
and Eliminative mapping F in relation to which < is element-induced. Two
possibilities are considered: #A = 1 and #A > 1:
If #A = 1 (A = fag), let x 2 XnA s.t. xPa. If f1(fx; ag) = x then, as <
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is element-induced, fx; ag  fag. If f1(fx; ag) = a, as < is n-times iterative
and F is Eliminative, f2(fx; ag) exists and is equal to x. Therefore, as < is
element-induced fag < fx; ag is impossible.
If #A > 1, let F (A) = fa1; a2; : : : ; amg. By n-times iterativeness and Elimi-
nation in Uncertain Prospects, m = #A. Let x 2 XnA such that xPai 8i  n. If
f1(A[fxg) = x, then, as < is element-induced, A[fxg  A. If f1(A[fxg) 6= x,
then, by Rationality, f1(A [ fxg) = a1 = f1(A). By Elimination in Uncertain
Prospects f2(A [ fxg) 6= a1. If f2(A [ fxg) = x, then, as < is n-times iterative,
A[fxg  A. If f2(A[fxg) 6= x, then, by Rationality, f2(A[fxg) = a2 = f2(A).
We can repeat analogously these steps to assert that only two circumstances are
possible:
(i): There exists k  m such that fk(A [ fxg) = x and fi(A [ fxg) = fi(A)
8i < k, in which case, as < is n-times iterative, A [ fxg  A.
or (ii): fi(A [ fxg) = fi(A) for all i  m, in which case, as < is n-times
iterative and Eliminative, fm+1(A) = x, and therefore, A [ fxg  A. ut
Theorem 11. Let < be an ordering dened on Z. <=<mM if and only if < is
a twice-iterative rule and satises (SRAV), (SUAV) and (PBAP).
Theorem 12. Let < be an ordering dened on Z. <=<Mm if and only if < is
a twice-iterative rule and satises (RAV), (SUAP) and (PBAP).
Theorem 13. Let < be an ordering dened on Z. <=<lmM if and only if <
satises (SRAV), (SUAV) and (SRICH), and it is n-times iterative in relation
to a mapping F which is Alternate Iteration Independent and Eliminative.
Theorem 14. Let < be an ordering dened on Z. <=<LMm if and only if <
satises (RAV) and (SUAP), and it is n-times iterative in relation to a mapping
F which is Alternate Iteration Independent and Eliminative
Proof of Theorem 11:
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The following proof is made provided that X contains at least three elements.
The case #X = 1 is degenerate, and in the case #X = 2, if < satises (SRAV)
and (PBAP), then directly <=<mM .
If < is twice-iterative, then it is element-induced by denition, and that
implies that all of the conditions of Denition 1 are satised.
Step 1 : We will prove that 8A 2 Z such that #A = 3 (A = fa; a; ag),
f1(A) = a:
By (SUAV) fag  A, which implies f1(A) 6= a. Let us supposse f1(A) 6= a.
Then f1(A) = a=f1(fag). As fag  A and < is twice-iterative, this implies that
f2(A) = a and f2(fag) = a. By (PBAP) A  fa; ag. As f1(A) = a, A  fa; ag is
only possible if (i): f1(fa; ag) = a or (ii): f1(fa; ag) = a and f2(A)Pf2(fa; ag).
If (i), by Rationality, f1(A) 6= a, which results in a contradiction. If (ii), as
A  fa; ag and f2(A) = a, then f2(fa; ag) must be strictly worse than a, which
is impossible. In sum, 8A 2 Z such that #A = 3, f1(A) = a.
Step 2 : 8A 2 Z such that #A = 2 and x 2 A, f1(A) = x:
Let A 2 Z (A = fa; xg). As #X  3, there exists b 2 XnA, b 6= a; x. By
Step 1 f1(fa; b; xg) = x. Therefore, by Rationality, f1(A) = x.
Step 3 : Let A 2 Z such that #A = 2. If f1(A) = a then f2(A) = a:
By (SRAV) fag  fa; ag. As < is element-induced and twice-iterative, if
f1(A) = a, then f2(A) exists and is equal to a; f1(fag) = a and f2(fag) exists
and is equal to a.
Step 4 : 8A 2 Z such that #A > 3, f1(A) = a.
Let us suppose that f1(A) = a 6= a. Take any a 2 A; a 6= a; a. By Step 1,
f1(fa; a; ag) 6= a. By Rationality f1(A) 6= a, reaching a contradiction.
Step 5 : 8A 2 Z such that #A  3, f2(A) = a:
By (PBAP) A  Anfag. As < is element-induced and twice-iterative, this is
only possible if (i): f1(A)Pf1(Ana) or (ii): f1(A) = f1(Anfa)g and f2(A)Pf2(Anfag).
By Step 1 and Step 4, f1(A) = a. That implies that case (i) is impossible,
and in case (ii), by Rationality implies f1(Ana) = a. By twice-iterativeness we
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know that f2(A) exists. Let us suppose f2(A) = a 6= a. Then, by Rationality,
f2(Ana) = a, which is in contradiction with (i). Therefore f2(A) = a.
Step 6 : Let A 2 Z such that #A = 2. Then, f1(A) = a implies f2(A) = a
As < is twice-iterative, this implies, by the denition of element-induced
rule, that f2(A) does exist. Let us suppose f2(A) = a. Then, by Rationality
f1(fag = a = f2(fag). As < is element-induced in relation to F , this implies
A  fag, which contradicts (PBAP).
From this point on, 8A 2 Z, if #A = 2 and x =2 A, A will be said to be a
peculiar set.
Then, Steps 1 to 6 prove that,
8A 2 Z s.t. #A  2, if A is not a peculiar set, then F (A) = fa; ag; and if A
is a peculiar set, then F (A) 2 ffa; ag; fa; agg. (1)
Step 7 : 8A;B 2 X, A mM B implies A  B:
A mM B implies aP b or (a = b and aP b).
Then, 8A;B 2 Z, four possibilities are considered:
1. Neither A nor B are peculiar: Then f1(A) = a, f1(B) = b.
If aP b, as < is element-induced, then A  B.
If (a = b and aP b) three cases will be considered:
{ Neither A nor B are a singleton. Then, by (1), f2(A) = a, f2(B) = b. As
< is twice-iterative in relation to F , that implies A  B.
{ A is a singleton. Then (a = b and aP b) is impossible.
{ B is a singleton (and A is not). Then, by (PBAP), fa; ag  fbg, that is,
A  B.
2. B is peculiar and A is not: Therefore F (A) = fa; ag.
If aP b, we consider two cases: A = fbg; and A 6= fbg. If A = fbg, then A  B
directly by (SRAV). If A 6= fbg, then there exists a 2 A such that aPb
and a 6= b. By (1), f1(fa; b; bg) = b. By Rationality, f1(fb; bg) = b, and as
< is element-induced in relation to F , therefore A  B.
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If a = b and aP b, by (1) f1(fa; b; bg) = b. By Rationality f1(fb; bg) = b, and
as < is element-induced in relation to F , A  B.
3. A is peculiar and B is not: Then f1(B) = b. If f1(A) = a, then by hypothesis
aP b and, as < is element-induced, then A  B. If f1(A) = a, then by (1),
f2(A) = a. Hence, in the case (aP b), then by element-induction, A  B. In
the case (a = b and aP b), f1(A) = f1(B) and (f2(A)Pf2(B) or f2(B) does
not exist). Therefore A  B
4. Both A and B are peculiar: Then four possibilities will be considered:
{ F (A) = fa; ag and F (B) = fb; bg. Then, if aP b, as < is element-induced,
therefore A  B. If a = b, let us suppose B < A, then that would imply
bRa, which would contradict the hypothesis that aP b or (a = b and aP b).
If bPa, then, by (1), f1(fb; a; ag = a, and, by Rationality, f1(fa; ag) = a,
reaching a contradiction.
{ F (A) = fa; ag and F (B) = fb; bg. If aRb, then aP b, and, by element-
induction, A  B. On the other hand, if bPa, then by (1), f1(fb; a; ag) =
a, which by Rationality implies f1(fa; ag) = a, reaching a contradiction.
{ F (A) = fa; ag and F (B) = fb; bg. Then, if aP b, by (1), f1(fa; b; bg) = b,
and by Rationality, f1(fb; bg) = b, reaching a contradiction. On the other
hand, if bRa, two cases will be considered: a) bRa, which is impossible
by hypothesis; and b) aP b, in which, by (1), f1(fb; a; bg) = b and by
Rationality, f1(fb; bg) = b, which is a contradiction.
{ F (A) = fa; ag and F (B) = fb; bg. Then, by hypothesis (aP b) or (a = b
and aP b), which by element-induction implies A  B.
Step 8 : 8A;B 2 X, A mM B implies A  B:
A mM B implies a = b and a = b.
8A;B 2 Z three possibilities will be considered:
1. Neither A nor B are peculiar: Consider #A;#B  2 (Note that if one of
them is a singleton then the other one must be the same set, and then, by
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reflexivity, A  B). Then, by (1), f1(A) = a; f1(B) = b; f2(A) = a and
f2(B) = b. As < is twice-iterative, therefore A  B.
2. B is peculiar and A is not (without loss of generality). Three cases will be
considered: (i): #A = 1. Then, by hypothesis, #B = 1, and B cannot be
peculiar, reaching a contradiction. (ii): #A = 2. If A is not peculiar, then
x 2 A. Therefore, by hypothesis, x 2 B, which implies that B is not peculiar,
reaching a contradiction. (iii): #A > 2. Then, if F (B) = fb; bg, as < is twice-
iterative, A  B. On the other hand, if F (B) = fb; bg, consider a 2 A s.t.
a 6= a; a. Then by (1), f1fb; a; bg = b, and by Rationality f1(B) = b, which
yields a contradiction.
3. Both A and B are peculiar. Then #A = #B = 2, which together with the
hypothesis, implies A = B. By reflexivity A  B.
The results of Steps 7 and 8 together imply <=<mM .
That <mM satises (SRAV), (PBAP) and (SUAV) is easily proven. To prove
that <mM is twice-iterative we have to prove: a) that there exists a rational
mapping F such that <mM is element-induced in relation to (k = 2; F ). And b)
that it is impossible to nd a rational mapping F 0 such that <mM is element-
induced in relation to (k = 1; F 0). To check part a), consider the corresponding
part of the proof of Lemma 4. To prove b), note that 8x; y 2 X such that xPy,
fxg mM fx; yg mM fyg. Then, suppossing that <mM were once-iterative,
if f1(fx; yg) = x then fxg  fx; yg, and if f1(fx; yg) = y then fyg  fx; yg,
reaching in either case a contradiction. ut
Proof of Theorem 12:
If < is twice-iterative, then, by denition, it is element-induced, and therefore
all of the conditions of Denition 1 are satised.
Step 1 : We will prove that 8A 2 Z such that #A = 3 (A = fa; a; ag),
f1(A) = a:
By (SUAP), fa; a; ag  fag, which by element-induction is only possible if
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f1(A) 2 fa; ag. Let us suppose that f1(A) = a. Then, by Rationality, f1(fa; ag) =
a. By (RAV) fag  fa; ag. As < is twice-iterative f2(fa; ag) exists, and fag 
fa; ag is only possible if f2(fa; ag) = a and f2(fag) also exists and is equal
to a. Then fa; a; ag  fag is only possible if f2(fa; a; ag) = a. By Rationality
f1(fa; ag) = a. By (RAV) fa; ag  fa; a; ag, which by < being twice-iterative is
impossible if f1(fa; a; ag) = a and f2(fa; a; ag) = a. Therefore, f1(A) = a.
Step 2 : 8A 2 Z such that #A = 2, if 9x 2 XnA s.t. aPx then f1(A) = a
and f2(A) = a. Also, 8x 2 X such that x 6= x; x, f1(fxg) = f2(fxg) = x.
Let us take x 2 XnA such that aPx. By Step 1 f1(A [ fxg) = a. Then, by
Rationality, f1(A) = a. By (RAV) fag  A. As < is element-induced and twice-
iterative f2(A) exists, and fag  A is only possible if f2(A) = a and f2(fag)
also exists and is equal to a.
Step 3 : 8A 2 Z such that #A = 3 (A = fa; a; ag), f2(A) = a:
By Step 2, f1(fa; ag) = a and f2(fa; ag) = a. By Step 1, f1(A) = a. By
(RAV), fa; ag  A, which, given that < is twice-iterative, is only possible if
f2(A) = a.
Step 4 : 8A 2 Z such that #A > 3, f1(A) = a and f2(A) = a:
Let us suppose that f1(A) = a 2 A, a 6= a. Take any A0  A s.t. #A0 = 3 and
a; a 2 A0. Then, by Rationality f1(A) = a, which contradicts Step 1. Therefore
f1(A) = a. We know by twice-iterativeness that f2(A) exists. Let us suppose
f2(A) = a0 2 A, a0 6= a. If a0 6= a, then by Rationality f2(fa; a0; ag) = a0, which
is in contradiction with Step 3. If a0 = a, let us take a 2 A s.t. a 6= a; a0. Then
f2(A) = a0 implies, by Rationality, f2(fa0; a; a) = a0, again contradicting Step 3.
In sum, from Steps 1 to 4 we can assert:
8A 2 Z, f1(A) = a and f2(A) = a except when A 2 ffx; xg; fxg; fxgg, in
which case nothing is proved about the values of F (A). (2)
Step 5 : 8A;B 2 X, A Mm B implies A  B:
A Mm B implies aP b or (a = b and aP b). Then, 8A;B 2 Z, four possibili-
ties will be considered:
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1. A;B =2 ffx; xg; fxg; fxgg:
aP b or (a = b and aP b) implies, by (2) and by twice iterativeness of <,
A  B
2. A 2 ffx; xg; fxg; fxgg; B =2 ffx; xg; fxg; fxgg: In this case aP b or (a = b
and aP b) is impossible.
3. B 2 ffx; xg; fxg; fxgg; A =2 ffx; xg; fxg; fxgg:
If aP b, by (2), f1(A) = a. Then, as < is element-induced, A  B. In this
case (a = b and aP b) is impossible.
4. A;B 2 ffx; xg; fxg; fxgg:
If aP b, then B = fxg and (A = fxg or A = fx; xg). If A = fxg, then
f1(A)Pf1(B), and therefore A  B. If A = fx; xg, then, by (PBAP), A  B.
If (a = b and aP b), then A = fxg and B = fx; xg. Then, by (RAV), A  B.
Step 6 : 8A;B 2 X, A Mm B implies A  B:
A Mm B implies a = b and a = b.
Again, three possibilities will be considered:
1. A;B =2 ffx; xg; fxg; fxgg:
By (2) f1(A) = a; f2(A) = a; f1(B) = b; f2(B) = b. As < is element-induced
and twice-iterative, A  B.
2. A 2 ffx; xg; fxg; fxgg; B =2 ffx; xg; fxg; fxgg (without loss of generality):
This case is impossible given that a = b.
3. A;B 2 ffx; xg; fxg; fxgg: Then a = b and a = b implies A = B, and by
reflexivity, A  B.
The results of Steps 5 and 6 together imply <=<Mm.
That <Mm satises (RAV), (PBAP) and (SUAP) is easily proven. To prove
that <Mm is twice-iterative, see the corresponding part in the proof of <mM .
Proof of Theorem 13:
The following proof is made provided that X contains at least three elements.
The case #X = 1 is degenerate, and in the case #X = 2, if < satises (SRAV)
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and if it is an n-times iterative rule in relation to an Eliminative F , then directly
<=<lmM .
If < is n-times iterative, it is element-induced by denition and therefore all
of the conditions of Denition 1 are satised.
Step 1 : We will prove that, under the properties of <, 8A 2 Z such that
#A = 3 (A = fa; a; ag), f1(A) = a:
Let us suppose that f1(A) 6= a. By (SUAV) fag  A. As< is element-induced
fag  A is only possible if f1(A) = a. Hence, by n-times iterativeness f2(A)
exists and by Elimination in Uncertain Prospects, f2(A) 2 fa; ag. f2(A) = a
is impossible because fag  A and < is n-time iterative. Therefore f2(A) = a.
Then, as < is element induced, f2(fag) = a. At this stage the proof is similar to
the proof of Step 1 in Theorem 11, for which (PBAP) is used, but by Lemma 10
(PBAP) is satised by <.
Step 2 : 8A 2 Z such that #A = 2 and x 2 A, f1(A) = a (= x).
As #X  3, 9x 2 XnA such that xPa. By Step 1 f1(fA [ fxg) = a. Then,
by Rationality, f1(A) = a.
Step 3 : 8A 2 Z such that #A > 3, f1(A) = a: See the proof of Step 4 of
Theorem 11.
Step 4 : 8A 2 Z such that #A = 3 (A = fa; a; ag), f2(A) = a:
By Step 1 f1(A) = a. By n-times iterativeness f2(A) exists. Let us sup-
pose f2(A) 6= a. Then, by Elimination in Uncertain Prospects, f2(A) = a. By
(SRICH) A  fa; ag. If f1(fa; ag) = a, then by n-times iterativeness f2(fa; ag)
exists, and by Elimination in Uncertain Prospects, f2(fa; ag) = a. Then, as < is
element-induced, fa; ag  A, reaching a contradiction. If f1(fa; ag) = a, then as
< is element-induced, fa; ag  A, again reaching a contradiction.
Therefore, f2(A) = a.
Step 5 : 8A 2 Z such that #A > 3, f2(A) = a.
By n-times iterativeness f2(A) exists. By Elimination in Uncertain Prospects
and Step 3, f2(A) 6= a. Let us suppose f2(A) = a0 s.t. a0 6= a; a. By Step 3
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f1(A) = a. By Step 1 f1(fa; a0; ag) = a. By Step 4 f2(fa; a0; ag) = a. Therefore,
by Rationality, f2(A) 6= a0, which turns into a contradiction.
Step 6 : 8A 2 Z such that #A = 2, f1(A) = a and f2(A) = a:
If x 2 A, f1(A) = a by Step 2. By n-times iterativeness f2(A) exists, and by
Elimination in Uncertain Prospects f2(A) = a.
If x =2 A, then let us suppose that f1(A) = a. By Step 1 f1(fa; a; xg) = x.
By Step 4 f2(fa; a; xg) = a.
By Alternate Iteration Independence f3(fa; a; xg)= f1(fa; a; xgnf1(fa; a; xg))=
f1(fa; ag) = a, which is in contradiction with Elimination in Uncertain Prospects.
Therefore f1(A) = a, and by Elimination in Uncertain Prospects f2(A) = a.
In sum, Steps 1 to 6 prove that:
8A 2 Z such that #A  2, f1(A) = a and f2(A) = a (3)
Step 7 : 8A 2 Z such that #A = m  2, 8l 2 N s.t. l  k, let us denote by
Al and Al the subsets of A consisting respectively of the l-worst elements and
l-best elements of A according to P . Then, 8i 2 N, i  m,
fi(A) =
8>><>>:
min(AnA(i−1)=2) if i is odd and m  (i− 1)
max(AnA(i−2)=2) if i is even and m  (i− 1)
does not exist if m < (i− 1)
The proof is direct applying Alternate Iteration Independence, Elimination in
Uncertain Prospects, and (3).
Step 8 : 8A;B 2 X, A lmM B implies A  B:
8A 2 Z, let A0 = A and
nA =
8<:#A=2 if #A is even(#A− 1)=2 if #A is odd
If nA > 0, let, for all t = 1; : : : ; nA, At = At−1nfat−1; at−1g. For all A;B 2 Z,
let nAB = min(fnA; nBg).
Then, A lmM B implies that 9t 2 f0; : : : ; nABg such that (As mM Bs8s 
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t) and (At mM Bt or Bt = ;)
Now, four cases are considered:
{ #A;#B > 1:
By Step 7, fi(A) =
8>><>>:
min(AnA(i−1)=2) if i is odd and m  (i− 1)
max(AnA(i−2)=2) if i is even and m  (i− 1)
does not exist if m < (i− 1)
.
And analogously, we know the values of any fi(B). Then, by hypothesis and
Step 7, 9l  n such that 8i 2 N, i < l, fi(A) = fi(B) and [fl(A)Rfl(B)
or (fl(A) exists and fl(B) does not exist)]. As < is element-induced and
n-times iterative, then A  B.
{ #A = 1 and #B > 1: By denition of element-induced rule, 8A 2 Z,
f1(A) 2 A. Therefore f1(A) = a. By (3) f1(B) = b and f2(B) = b. A lmM
B implies aRb. If aP b, then, as < is element-induced, A  B. If a = b, then
A lmM B implies aRb. It is only possible that a = a if b = b, that is, if
#B = 1, which is a contradiction.
{ #A > 1 and #B = 1. By (3) f1(A) = a and f2(A) = a. Also, by the
denition of element-induced rule, f1(B) = b, and f2(B), if it exists, is equal
to b. On the other hand A lmM B implies aRb. If aP b, then since < is
element-induced, A  B. If a = b, then as #B = 1, aP b. Since < is element-
induced and n-times iterative, hence A  B.
{ #A = 1, #B = 1. Then A lmM B implies aP b, that is, f1(A)Pf1(B).
Then, by element induction, A  B.
Step 9 : 8A;B 2 X, A lmM B implies A  B:
By denition of <lmM , A lmM B implies A = B. Then, by reflexivity of <,
A  B.
The results of Steps 8 and 9 together imply <=<lmM .
That<lmM satises (SRAV), (SUAV) and (SRICH) is easily proven. To prove
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that there exists a pair (k; F ) such that k = n, that F is rational, Alternate
Iteration Independent and Eliminative, and that <lmM is element-induced in
relation to (k; F ), see the corresponding part of the proof in Lemma 4. Moreover,
to prove that <lmM is n-times iterative, note that <lmM is a linear ordering,
and therefore Lemma 5 applies. ut
Proof of Theorem 14: The case X = 1 is degenerate and if X = 2, then
by directly applying (RAV) and the fact that < is an n-times iterative rule in
relation to an Eliminative F , we reach <=<LMm. Hence, the following proof is
made provided that X contains at least 3 elements.
If < is n-times iterative, then it is also element-induced by denition, and
therefore all of the conditions of Denition 1 are satised.
Step 1 : We will prove that, under the properties of <, then 8A 2 Z such that
#A = 3 (A = fa; a; ag), f1(A) = a:
By (SUAP) fa; a; ag  fag. Since < is element-induced fa; a; ag  fag is
only possible if f1(A) = a or f1(A) = a. Let us suppose f1(A) = a. By Ra-
tionality, f1(fa; ag) = a, and by n-times iterativeness and Elimination in Un-
certain Prospects f2(fa; ag) exists and is equal to a. By (RAV) fag  fa; ag.
Therefore, as < is element-induced, f1(fag) = f2(fag) = a. Again, by (SUAP),
fa; a; ag  fag. By n-times iterativeness f2(A) exists. If f1(A) = a, by Elimina-
tion in Uncertain Prospects fa; a; ag  fag is only possible if f2(A) = a. Also,
by Rationality, f1(fa; ag) = a. In sum, we have, by Elimination in Uncertain
Prospects and n-times iterativeness, the following values of F : f1(fa; ag) = a;
f2(fa; ag) = a; f3(fa; ag) does not exist; f1(A) = a; f2(A) = a; f3(A) = a. If
< is n-times iterative, then A  fa; ag, which results in a contradiction with
(RAV). Hence, 8A 2 Z such that #A = 3, f1(A) = a.
Step 2 : 8A 2 Z such that #A = 2, if 9x 2 XnA s.t. aPx (that is, A 6= fx; xg),
then f1(A) = a and f2(A) = a.
Let us take x 2 XnA such that aPx. By Step 1 f1(A [ fxg) = a. Then, by
Rationality, f1(A) = a. By n-times iterativeness and Elimination in Uncertain
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Prospects f2(A) exists and is equal to a.
Step 3 : 8A 2 Z such that #A = 3 (A = fa; a; ag), f2(A) = a and f3(A) = a:
By Step 2, f1(fa; ag) = a and f2(fa; ag) = a. By Step 1, f1(A) = a. By
n-times iterativeness, we know that f2(A) and f3(A) exist. Let us suppose
that f2(A) = a. Then, by Elimination in Uncertain Prospects, f3(A) = a and
f3(fa; ag) does not exist. Hence, by element-induction, A  fa; ag, which con-
tradicts (RAV)
Step 4 : 8A 2 Z such that #A > 3, f1(A) = a and f2(A) = a: See Step 4 in
the proof of Theorem 12.
Step 5 : f1(fx; xg) = x and f2(fx; xg) = x:
Let a 2 X, a 6= x; x. By Step 3 f3(fa; x; xg)=x, which by Alternate Itera-
tion Independence is the same element as f1(fa; x; xgn(f1(fa; x; xg)). By Step
1 f1(fa; x; xg) = a. Therefore f1(fx; xg) = x. By Elimination in Uncertain
Prospects, f2(fx; xg) = x.
In sum, Steps 1 to 5 prove that:
8A 2 Z such that #A  2, f1(A) = a and f2(A) = a (4)
Step 6 : 8A 2 Z such that #A = m  2, 8l 2 N such that l  m, let us denote
by Al and Al the subsets of A consisting respectively on the l-worst elements
and l-best elements of A according to P . Then 8i 2 N, i  m,
fi(A) =
8>><>>:
max(AnA(i−1)=2) if i is odd and m  (i− 1)
min(AnA(i−2)=2) if i is even and m  (i− 1)
does not exist if m < (i− 1)
The proof is direct applying Alternate Iteration Independence, Elimination in
Uncertain Prospects, and (4).
Step 7 : 8A;B 2 X, A LMm B implies A  B, and A LMm B implies
A  B:
The proof is analogous to that of Steps 8 and 9 in Theorem 13, for which
(PBAP) is necessary, but by Lemma 10, (PBAP) is satised by <.
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That <LMm satises (RAV) and (SUAP) is easily proven. To prove that
there exists a pair (k; F ) such that k = n, that F is rational, Alternate Iteration
Independent and Eliminative, and that <lmM is element-induced in relation
to (k; F ), see the corresponding part of the proof in Lemma 4. Moreover, to
prove that <LMm is n-times iterative note that <LMm is a linear ordering, and
therefore Lemma 5 applies. ut
The following examples establish the independence of the conditions used in
Theorems 11, 12, 13 and 14, provided that #X  2. The case #X = 1 is clearly
degenerate. For all of the examples provided below, we will assume that sets are
ordered according to R from their best to their worst element.
1. <mM
{ <lm satises (SRAV), (SUAV) and (PBAP) but is not twice-iterative.
{ Let X = fx; y; zg, and let < be the ordering overX induced the following
F : for all A 2 Z s.t. A 6= fx; yg, F (A) = fa; ag, and F (fx; yg) = fx; xg.
Then < is a twice-iterative rule that satises (SUAV) and (PBAP), but
not (SRAV).
{ <Mm is a twice-iterative rule that satises (SRAV) and (PBAP), but
not (SUAV).
{ Let X = fx; y; zg, and let < be the ordering over X induced by the
following F : for all A 2 Z such that A 6= fx; yg, F (A) = fa; ag, and
F (fx; yg) = fy; yg. Then < is a twice-iterative rule that satises (SUAV)
and (SRAV), but not (PBAP).
2. <Mm
{ Let X = fx; y; zg, and let fxg  fx; yg  fx; zg  fx; y; zg  fyg 
fy; zg  fzg. Then < satises (RAV), (SUAP) and (PBAP), but is not
element-induced. Therefore it cannot be twice-iterative.
{ Let X = fx; y; zg, and let < be the ordering over X induced by F such
that, 8A 2 X, A 6= fx; yg, F (A) = fa; ag, and F (fx; yg) = fx; xg. Then
38
< is a twice-iterative rule that satises (SUAP) and (PBAP), but not
(RAV).
{ <mM is a twice-iterative rule that satises (RAV) and (PBAP), but not
(SUAP).
{ Let X = fx; y; zg, and let < be the ordering over X induced by the
following F : 8A 2 X, A 6= fy; zg, F (A) = fa; ag, and F (fy; zg) = fz; zg.
Then < is a twice-iterative rule that satises (SUAP) and (RAV), but
not (PBAP).
3. <lmM
{ Let X = fx; yg, and let < be the ordering over X induced by F such
that, 8A 2 Z, F (A) = a. Then < is element-induced in relation to
an Alternate Iteration Independent and Eliminative mapping F , and it
satises (SRAV), (SRICH) and (SUAV), but it is not n-times iterative.
{ Let X = fx; y; zg, and let fxg  fx; yg  fyg  fx; y; zg  fy; zg 
fx; zg  fzg. Then < satises (SRAV), (SUAV) and (SRICH). It is
possible to nd a rational and Eliminative mapping F with which <
is element-induced, (and as < is a linear ordering then it is n-times
iterative). But it is impossible to nd an Alternate Iteration Independent,
Eliminative and rational F in relation to which < is element-induced.
{ Let X = fx; y; zg, and let < be the ordering over X induced by the fol-
lowing F : F (X) = fz; y; xg; F (fx; yg) = fx; y; yg; F (fx; zg) = fz; z; xg;
F (fy; zg) = fz; y; yg; F (fxg) = fx; xg; F (fyg) = fy; yg; and F (fzg) =
fz; zg. Then < satises (SRAV), (SUAV) and (SRICH), and it is an
n-times iterative rule in relation to a mapping F which is Alternate
Iteration Indepedent, but F is not Eliminative.
{ Let X = fx; yg and let < be the ordering overX induced by: F (fx; yg) =
fx; yg; F (fxg) = x; and F (fyg) = y. Then < is an n-times iterative rule
in relation to a mapping F which is Alternate Iteration Independent
and Eliminative. Also, < satises (SUAV) and (SRICH), but it does not
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satisfy (SRAV).
{ <LMm is an n-times iterative rule in relation to certain mapping F
which is Alternate Iteration Independent and Eliminative. Furthermore,
< satises (SRAV) and (SRICH), but it does not satisfy (SUAV).
{ Let X = fx; y; zg, and let < be the ordering over X induced by F
such that, F (X) = fz; y; xg; F (fx; yg) = fx; yg; F (fx; zg) = fz; xg;
F (fy; zg) = fz; yg; F (fxg) = fx; xg; F (fyg) = fy; yg; and F (fzg) =
fz; zg. Then < is n-times iterative in relation to an Alternate Iteration
Independent and Eliminative mapping F . Also, < satises (SRAV) and
(SUAV), but it does not satisfy (SRICH).
4. <LMm
{ Let X = fx; yg, and let < be the ordering over X induced by the fol-
lowing F : 8A 2 Z, F (A) = a. Then < is element-induced in relation to
an Alternate Iteration Independent and Eliminative mapping F , and it
satises (RAV) and (SUAP), but it is not n-times iterative.
{ Let X = fx; y; zg, and let < be the ordering over X induced by the
following F : F (X) = fx; z; yg; F (fx; yg) = fx; yg; F (fx; zg) = fx; zg;
F (fy; zg) = fz; yg; F (fxg) = fx; xg; F (fyg) = fy; yg; and F (fz; zg) =
fzg. Then < satises (RAV) and (SUAP), and it is an n-times iterative
rule in relation to an Eliminative mapping F , but F is not Alternate
Iteration Independent.
{ Let X = fx; y; zg, and let < be the ordering over X induced by the fol-
lowing F : F (X) = fx; z; yg, F (fx; yg) = fx; y; yg, F (fx; zg) = fx; z; zg,
F (fy; zg) = fy; z; zg, F (fxg) = fx; xg, F (fyg) = fy; yg, and F (fzg) =
fz; zg. Then < satises (RAV) and (SUAP), and it is an n-times itera-
tive rule in relation to F , which is Alternate Iteration Independent, but
not Eliminative.
{ Let X = fx; y; zg, and let < be the ordering over X induced by the
following F : F (X) = fx; z; yg, F (fx; yg) = fx; yg, F (fx; zg) = fx; zg,
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F (fy; zg) = fy; zg, F (fxg) = fxg, F (fyg) = fyg, and F (fzg) = fzg.
Then < is an n-times iterative rule in relation to an Alternate Iteration
Independent and Eliminative mapping F . Also, < satises (SUAP), but
it does not satisfy (RAV).
{ <lmM is an n-times iterative rule in relation to certain F which is Al-
ternate Iteration Independent, and Eliminative. Also, <lmM satises
(RAV), but it does not satisfy (SUAP).
7 Final Remarks
Unlike other works in the eld, in the previous sections the problem of choice
under complete uncertainty has been approached at three analytical levels. At
the rst level, the model concentrates on element-induced evaluation processes.
Two dierent kinds of arguments support this assumption. The rst one is merely
based on the conrmation that almost all work in the eld so far has converged to
this type of rules. Secondly, deliberative arguments, supported by experimental
evidence, lead to the idea that element-induced processings provide a fair and
flexible equilibrium between two important factors in the context of uncertainty:
computational costs, and the desire to choose accurately.
At the second level, an adaptation of the classical principle of revealed pref-
erence has been applied to the mental process of deciding which outcome(s) is
(are) representative(s) or focal(s) within a particular action, that is, what we
have called \evaluation processes." The result is a class of rules where individ-
ual attitudes towards uncertainty do not play yet any role . This aspect has
been introduced at the third analytical level by means of a few simple axioms,
allowing us to characterize some criteria of the literature as particular cases of
element-induced rational rules.
Some plausible rules, such as median-based rules or second-best based rules
(see Nitzan and Pattanaik [29], Sen [36], Baigent and Gaertner [3] or Gaertner
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and Xu [17, 18]) are element-induced (and clearly seek some kind of procedu-
ral rationality) but they fail our assumption of Rationality. This suggests that
such assumption is susceptible to adaptations and modications and leaves open
questions for further investigation.
Finally, some other non-element-induced processings have been quoted in the
previous sections, such as the satiscing rule, the majority of conrming dimen-
sions rule, and others. Some of these have been well studied from an experimental
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